Bret Stephens is the Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign affairs columnist for the Wall Street Journal, arguably the nation’s most liberal newspaper. I read his column regularly so I was gratified that he published a book on America’s role (or lack of one) in world affairs. Mr. Stephens is a gifted writer and his book is both informative and thought provoking. I don’t agree completely with his premise that the United States cannot afford to shirk its “responsibility” to remain the world’s moral, political and military champion. And I reject outright his proposed solution, that America must assume the role of “world cop” in order to keep tyrants and despots at bay lest their local mischief grow into a threatening international crisis.Stephens presents a cogent history of America’s isolationist tendencies and how such behavior often leads to negative consequences. He goes into considerable detail laying out a compelling case that we are now revisiting scenarios that played out in the 1930s—and most Americans over the age of 35 know that didn’t end well. I agree. We differ strongly on how the United States should use its power and influence to manage an increasingly fractious world. Stephens proposes that the United States become something like a world cop using the “broken windows” theory of law enforcement. Here, in my opinion, Mr. Stephens’ liberal upbringing, education, and lack of military experience lead him astray.Soldiers are not, and should never be, policemen. There is a vast gulf between cops working within a framework of laws and soldiers who, until recent times, operate in a much looser environment that includes state-sanctioned killing. Stephens offers the Syrian civil war as an example of where the United States should have stepped in to stop the misery and slaughter. Really? Rule number one when in a position to dispatch troops to foreign lands: Never, under any circumstances, interfere in a foreign civil war. It is a lose-lose proposition. No matter which side you take, the opposing side will hate you forever. Korea, 1950, a civil war. Outcome: stalemate, over 40,000 US KIA/MIA, and there are still nearly 30,000 US military personnel in-country. Vietnam, mid-1950s onward, a civil war, Outcome: over 60,000 US KIA/MIA, we were soundly defeated and shown the door.In an age where military campaigns are governed by “rules of engagement” written by lawyers ensconced in small windowless cubicles, where are we to find the sort of “cop” that fits Stephens’ criteria? Don’t count on the US military. There just aren’t enough US Marines to police the world. Forget the US Army; it hasn’t won a war since 1945 and has become too bloated to cost-effectively field troops (average cost per year per US soldier in Afghanistan: 2.1 million dollars). Forget the US Air Force; hundred million dollar aircraft dropping $10,000 JDAMs on some Wahhabi jihadist is neither good tactics nor cost-effective policy. Forget the US Navy; it hasn’t changed tactics since 1944 and, like the Air Force, relies more and more on increasingly expensive toys. To his credit, Stephens does address the US military’s irrational quest for expensive high-tech equipment despite little evidence to date that they work to win wars.Make no mistake. Cops are only effective when they are backed up by a sound framework of laws and jurisprudence. That necessary legal infrastructure will not be found in the places where Stephens’ world cops would be stationed or sent. Stephens opines that a strong United States policing the world would deter those bent on aggression, provide a security safety net under our allies, and give us a wider buffer for our own self-protection. Desirable goals, but the devil is in the details. The author suggests we must get better at selecting where to use force. Yeah, right. So the CIA must not only be clairvoyant but unerringly accurate in its assessments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff must remember maxims from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War and ignore their historical predilection for ticket punching. Our elected officials must be replaced by something other than failed ambulance chasers, community organizers, and wannabe Caesars. And finally the US public needs to learn (or relearn) what it takes to win wars: killing and destruction on such a scale that the opposing side has but two choices: capitulation or extermination. Fat chance. Americans want to be loved, not feared. As a consequence, all of our institutions are currently geared to attaining a form of international mind-meld, from bribing both our friends and enemies to a kinder, gentler military presence. Such a course will end badly for, if anything, this century has clearly demonstrated America just can’t afford nation building. We need something much more direct and forceful than a cop on a beat.The best chapter in this book? Stephens is in his element when he uses his considerable knowledge of world issues and international affairs to lay out fictional, but plausible, crisis that might erupt around the world. Would-be authors take note: there are great ideas for a book here.I thoroughly enjoyed this book and, despite my reservations about its conclusions, recommend it. Sorry, Mr. Stephens. There is a reason why Americans traditionally seek isolationism. We always get the short end of the stick trying to save someone else’s ass. As Americans living in a fractious world, we don’t need to be loved. We need to be feared.